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STATE OF FLORIDA
QUESTIONS PRESENTED
Does a mere dog sniff, which can only detect the presence or absence of illegal narcotics 
and lasts less than five minutes, outside the fi'ont door of a grow house constitute an 
unreasonable search within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment?
Is the Florida Supreme Court decision that a minimally intrusive dog sniff, outside the 
front door of a house, can only be used after establishing probable cause supported by 
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^ The opinion of the Supreme Court of Florida is reported at Jardines v. Florida, 73 So. 3d
34 (Fla. 2011).
JURISDICTION
^ The Florida Supreme Court reversed the Third District Court of Appeal of Florida on
April 14,2011. The State of Florida filed for writ of certiorari on October 26, 2011. This Court 
granted the petition on January 6, 2012. The jurisdiction of this Court is invoked pursuant to 28 
U.S.C. § 1257(a).
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9 STANDARD OF REVIEW
Review of a motion to suppress evidence is subject to two different standards of review. 
United States v. Melancon. 662 F.3d 708, 711 (5th Cir. 2011). Legal conclusions are reviewed 
^ de novo. Id The findings of fact are only overturned upon a determination of clear error. ^
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Preliminary Statement
On December 6, 2006, the State of Florida charged defendant Joelis Jardines with one 
count of caimabis trafficking and one count of third-degree grand theft. (J.A 2.) Before trial, 
defendant moved to suppress evidence seized from his residence, claiming that Detective Pedraja
lacked the probable cause necessary for obtaining a residential search warrant. (J.A. 17.) An
evidentiary hearing was held on June 8,2007 to determine the circumstances surrounding the 
0 search and whether the evidence should be suppressed. (J.A. 21.) On June 13, 2007, the trial
court granted the motion to suppress, stating that the use of the narcotics detection dog, Franky, 
to detect the presence of narcotics constituted an illegal search and could not be used as 
^ justification to obtain the warrant. (J.A. 134.) The trial court also stated that other legally
obtained evidence was insufficient to establish a basis for finding probable cause.
(J.A. 134, 135.) The state appealed the decision to the Third District Court of Appeal of Florida. 
Florida v. Jardines. 9 So. 3d I, 2 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2008).
The district court delivered its opinion on October 22, 2008. Id. at 1. It reversed the trial 
court’s suppression ruling, stating that probable cause did exist for the issuance of the warrant.
f
Id. at 2. The district court reasoned that a dog sniff is not a Fourth Amendment search, and that 
Detective Bartelt had a right to conduct a dog sniff at the defendant’s door. Id. at 10. The 
, defendant appealed the decision to the Florida Supreme Court. The Florida Supreme Court
2
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iv granted review, acknowledging that the district court judgment certified conflict with the
decision in State v. Rabb. 920 So. 2d 1175 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2006). Jardines v. Florida, 73 So. 
3d 34, 35 (Fla. 2011). The Florida Supreme Court reversed the district court, holding that: (1) a 
^ dog sniff at the front door of a residence is considered a search; (2) the government must
establish probable cause before conducting such a search; and (3) the decision to suppress 
evidence seized from Respondent’s residence was properly made. Id. at 36, 37. The Florida
#
Supreme Court restored the trial court decision to suppress the evidence. Id. at 56.
The State of Florida filed a petition for writ of certiorari on October 26, 2011. (J.A. I.) 
This Court granted the petition on January 6,2012. (J.A. 1.)
Statement of the Facts
On November 3, 2006, Detective William Pedraja of the Miami-Dade County Police 
0 Department received a Crime Stoppers tip indicating that defendant Joelis Jardines was growing
marijuana at 13005 SW 257th Terrace, Homestead, FL 33032. (J-A. 3, 8.) At 7:00 A.M. on 
December 5, 2006, Pedraja arrived at the location to conduct basic visual surveillance. (J.A. 32.) 
^ Fifteen minutes later, Detective Douglas Bartelt arrived with his canine companion Franky.
(J.A. 32.) With Franky in the lead, Bartelt approached the front porch of the home. (J.A. 32.) 
Bartelt was standing approximately six to eight feet from the front door and Pedraja was behind 
Bartelt. (J.A. 51,53.) As soon as Franky crossed the threshold of the porch, he began tracking 
an odor. (J.A. 49.) Franky traced the source of that odor to the front door of the home.
(J.A. 94.) As soon as Franky identified the source of the odor as the base of the front door,
f
Bartelt and Franky returned to their vehicle. (J.A. 53.) Pedraja was notified of the positive alert 
by Bartelt as he walked away. (J.A. 53.) At no time was Bartelt actually at the front door.
3
(J.A. 56.) Bartelt had several other scheduled detection tasks that day so he left shortly 
thereafter, having been on location less than ten minutes. (J.A. 54.)
Pcdraja approached the front door as Bartelt left. (J.A. 36.) The strong, unmistakable 
odor of live marijuana plants immediately assaulted Pedraja as he neared the front door.
(J.A. 36.) Pedraja knocked on the front door several times intending to request permission to 
search the premises. (J.A. 9.) While waiting for a response, Pedraja noticed that the window 
shades were drawn. (J.A. 9.) He also noticed the air conditioning unit was nmning despite the 
early December morning. (J.A. 9.) Pedraja received no response to his knock and he returned to 
his car. (J.A. 37-38.) As he left, he noted that the air conditioning unit had been running the 
entire time without stopping or recycling. (J.A. 7.) Pedraja left the location to prepare an 
affidavit for a warrant. (J.A. 38.) Pedraja observed no traffic at the home and no vehicles in the 
driveway. (J.A. 43-44.) His presence at the location lasted less than one hour. (J.A. 37, 54.)
Detective Pedraja is a seventeen-year veteran of law enforcement and has been working 
on cases involving hydroponics labs for four years. (J.A. 5.) Based on his extensive experience, 
Pedraja testified that growing operations are generally isolated froni the distribution operation to 
avoid notice. (J.A. 44.) Thus, lack of vehicles and traffic at the building were also indicative of 
a growing operation, as opposed to a distribution operation. (J.A. 44.) He indicated that 
growing operations prefer to remain isolated from their neighbors to avoid detection. (J.A. 44.) 
Pedraja testified that the closed window shades were consistent with the desire to hide the 
contraband plants from view. (J.A. 9.) Pedraja explained that the continuously running air 
conditioner was an important factor because indoor growing operations use high powered lamps 
that generate tremendous amount of heat. (J.A. 38.) Thus, the air conditioning unit must run 












preventing the air conditioning unit from recycling tends to prevent the distinctive odor of 
marijuana from escaping the building. (J.A. 7.)
Detective Bartelt is a nine-year veteran of the Miami-Dade Police Department and is a 
six-year veteran of the Narcotics Bureau. (J.A. 10.) He has been a certified canine handler for 
two years and has participated in continuous training programs during that time. (J.A. 11-12.) 
Bartelt has worked over 600 controlled substance searches. (J.A. 10.) Franky has worked 
approximately 656 narcotics detections tasks. (J.A. 13.) Franky’s positive alerts have been 
instrumental in the detection and seizure of approximately 13,008 grams of cocaine, 2,638 grams 
of heroin, 180 grams of methamphetamine, and 936,614 grams of growing or processed 
marijuana. (J.A. 13.)
Based on the extensive evidence collected by experienced detectives, the magistrate 
judge found that probable cause existed and issued a search warrant to the police an hour later. 
(J.A. 17.) In executing the warrant, police discovered a hydroponic marijuana laboratory.
(J.A. 112.) Over twenty-five pounds of marijuana were recovered. (J.A. 112.) The defendant 
was detained while attempting to flee the premises and arrested in connection with the growing 
operation. (J.A. 17, 112.) Detective Pedraja subsequently interviewed the defendant, and the 
defendant confessed both orally and in a written statement. (J.A. 17.)
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The Florida Supreme Court ignored thirty years of this Court’s precedent when it 
erroneously held that a dog sniff is a search. Pursuant to the test set forth in Katz v. United 
States, a search does not violate the Fourth Amendment unless the defendant manifests a 
subjective expectation of privacy that society recognizes as objectively reasonable. The 
defendant did not manifest any expectation of privacy in the air surrounding his front porch. The
5
detectives conducted the dog sniff in areas where any member of the public could be present. 
Furthermore, the defendant took no affirmative steps to prevent the public from accessing his 
porch.
The dog sniff violated no objectively reasonable expectations of privacy. Congress has 
determined that no one may have a legitimate expectation of privacy in illegal narcotics. Even 
though the dog sniff can only detect the presence or absence of narcotics and nothing more, it 
cannot infringe on legitimate privacy interests. Further, the dog sniff was a minimally intrusive 
procedure. Here, the procedure lasted less than five minutes and infnnged upon no protected 
areas of the home. Furthermore, dog noses are not technology of the type that this Court has 
held violates of the Fourth Amendment. Unlike thermal imagers and global positioning tracking 
devices, humans have been utilizing dogs and their powerful olfactory abilities for centuries. 
Additionally, the defendant cannot have a reasonable expectation of privacy in information that 
is willingly conveyed to the public.
The Florida Supreme Court’s decision that a dog sniff, if a search, requires reasonable 
suspicion was incorrect. The court improperly refused to apply a reasonableness balancing test 
even though circumstances justified its use. Applying this test would have yielded the result that 
a dog sniff only requires an evidentiary showing of reasonable suspicion because it was 
minimally intrusive and the government had a substantial interest in utilizing it. Applying the 
standard of reasonable suspicion would have been enough to justify a search of the defendant s 
residence.














I. A MERE DOG SNIFF OUTSIDE THE FRONT DOOR OF A GROW HOUSE BY A 
WELL-TRAINED NARCOTICS DETECTION DOG LASTING LESS THAN FIVE 
MINUTES DID NOT VIOLATE ANY LEGITIMATE PRIVACY INTERESTS AND 
DOES NOT CONSTITUTE AN UNREASONABLE SEARCH WITHIN THE 
MEANING OF THE FOURTH AMENDMENT.
The Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution protects citizens against 
unreasonable searches and seizures. U.S. Const, amend. IV. The primary test to determine 
whether a search has occurred asks (1) did the defendant manifest a subjective expectation of 
privacy and (2) is society willing to recognize that expectation as reasonable. Katz v. United 
States. 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring). Ultimately, “[t]he Fourth Amendment 
protects people from unreasonable government intrusions into their legitimate expectations of 
privacy.” United States v. Place. 462 U.S. 696, 706-07 (1983) (emphasis added) (quoting United 
States V. Chadwick. 433 U.S. 1, 7 (1977) (internal quotations marks omitted) (abrogated on other 
grounds by California v. Acevedo. 500 U.S. 565 (1991) (reasoning that the privacy protection 
provided by Chadwick was minimal). It does not mandate a general right to privacy. Katz, 389 
U.S. at 350. This Court has consistently held that dog sniffs do not run afoul the Fourth 
Amendment because dog sniffs violate no subjective expectations of privacy and only detect 
substances in which society is not willing to recognize a reasonable expectation of privacy. See 
Illinois v. Caballes. 543 U.S. 405, 409 (2005); Place. 462 U.S. at 707.
A. There Was No Search Because the Defendant Did Not Have a Subiectivelv
Reasonable Expectation of Privacy in the Odors on His Front Porch.
1. The defendant did not have a subjective expectation of privacy in the front 
porch area because it is accessible to any member of the public.
It is well established that law enforcement officials may freely go where other members
of the public may go. United States v. Titemore. 437 F.3d 251, 260 (2d Cir. 2006); United States.
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0 V. Tavlor. 90 F.3d 903,909 (4th Cir. 1996) (holding that the “front entrance was as open to the
law enforcement officers as [it was] to any delivery person, guest, or other member of the 
public.”). In Titemore. Trooper Baxter went to Tilemore’s home to investigate an allegation that 
^ Titemore had vandalized someone else’s home. 437 F.3d at 253. In order to approach the
home’s sliding-glass door, Baxter walked around a fence and across 1 itemore’s front lawn. Id 
at 254. Once at the doorway, Baxter introduced himself and began a conversation with the
defendant. Id Eventually, Baxter entered the residence to secure a rifle laying in plain view. Id 
at 255. The defendant was indicted on charges relating to possession of a firearm. Id Titemore 
moved to suppress the evidence alleging that Baxter’s presence at the sliding glass door was 
illegal. Id at 256.
The court reasoned that the lawn and the sliding-glass door “constitute[d] part of a 
0 principal entryway, which ha[d] associated with it a diminished expectation of privacy.” Id at
259. Despite the presence of a fence, “the porch area and lawn were not completely enclosed, 
and thus separated from the public ....” Id It was also important that “the sliding-glass door 
^ was in fact a primary entrance visible to and used by the public.” Id The court concluded that
Titemore could not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in those areas. Id Thus, the court 
held that “there was no offense to the Fourth Amendment when Trooper Baxter approached the 
^ sliding-glass door.... [Njeither the rifle seized by the trooper ... nor Titemore’s statements
was the fhiit of an unlawful entry.” Id at 259-60.
Similar to Titemore. the defendant’s front door and porch in this case were open to all
f
members of the public. The detectives approached via a principal entryway, the driveway.
(J.A. 32.) There was no enclosure separating these areas from the public or otherwise limiting 












entrance that the public would see and use. (J.A. 32.) Thus, just as in Titcmore. the detectives 
were legally present in the front door and porch area of defendant’s residence.
2. The defendant did not have a subjective expectation of privacy in his front 
porch because he took no steps to isolate it from the public.
“What a person knowingly exposes to the public, even in his own home ... is not a
subject of Fourth Amendment protection.” Katz. 389 U.S. at 351 (emphasis added). In
California v. Ciraolo. 476 U.S. 207, 209 (1986), the defendant was growing marijuana in his
backyard. The interior of the backyard was not visible from street level because of a six-foot and
ten-foot fence enclosing the space. Id. The police chartered a plane to fly over the defendant s
property and were able to view marijuana plants growing in the backyard. Id. Despite the fact
that the defendant had erected two fences to protect his backyard, this Court was not convinced
that the defendant had “a subjective expectation of privacy from all observations of his backyard
...Id at 212 (emphasis in original). Any member of the public could have viewed the
defendant’s backyard while flying in a commercial airplane. Id at 215. Thus, any expectation
the defendant had in the privacy of his backyard when viewed from above was unreasonable. Id
at 214. This Court held that because police viewed the defendant’s exposed backyard from a
public place (public airspace), there was no Fourth Amendment violation. Id
In the present case, the defendant made no effort to conceal or otherwise sequester his
front porch. Whereas the defendant in Ciraolo had two tall fences and still did not demonstrate a
sufficient expectation of privacy, the defendant here has no fence at all. There were no signs
around the defendant’s property indicating trespassing was prohibited. Any member of the
public could have lawfully stood on defendant’s front porch and smelled the marijuana wafting
from the defendant’s front door. The defendant willingly exposed the smell of his marijuana













B. There Was No Search Because Defendant Did Not Have a Reasonable
Expectation of Privacy That Society Would Be Willing to Accept.
A legitimate expectation of privacy is “more than a subjective expectation of not being 
discovered.” United States v. Jacobsen. 466 U.S. 109, 120 n.22 (1984). In Caballes, this Court 
reiterated that “any interest in possessing contraband cannot be deemed ‘legitimate’ ...543 
U.S. at 408. An expectation that illicit activity will not be discovered by the authorities is not an 
expectation that society is prepared to accept as reasonable. Id. at 409. Additionally, a dog sniff 
is a minimally intrusive procedure that is sui generis. Id, Accordingly, the defendant could not 
have an objectively reasonable expectation of privacy in his illegal marijuana growing lab.
1. There was no search because society does not recognize any legitimate 
expectation of privacy in contraband.
In Jacobsen, government agents discovered a package containing white powder. 466 
U.S. at 123. The agents performed a field test on a small quantity of the white powder, thereby 
destroying it. Id at 124. If positive, the test would confirm the suspicion that the substance was 
cocaine, but if the test results were negative, the agents would only know that the white powder 
was not cocaine. Id at 123. No fiirther information about the white powder would be gained.
Id. Given that Congress had determined that any interest in privately possessing contraband is 
illegitimate, a test that could only “reveal whether a substance is cocaine, and no other arguably 
‘private’ fact, compromise[d] no legitimate privacy interest.” Id Jacobsen teaches that where 
no legitimate privacy interests are involved, the Fourth Amendment does not apply. Id
Additionally, dog sniffs are one of the few tools still available to law enforcement that do 
“not constitute a ‘search’ within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment” because such searches 
are minimally intrusive. See Place. 462 U.S. at 707 (holding that a dog sniff of luggage was not 












543 U.S. at 406. During this routine traffic stop, an officer walked a narcotics detection dog 
around the defendant's vehicle. Id The dog gave an alert at the vehicle’s trunk. Id Based on 
that alert, the officers searched the trunk, found marijuana, and arrested the defendant. Id The 
entire chain of events took less than ten minutes. Id This Court reaffirmed its position that “a 
canine sniff by a well-trained narcotics-detection dog [is] ^sui generis^ because it discloses only 
the presence or absence of narcotics, a contraband item.’” Id at 409 (quoting Pla^, 462 U.S. at 
707) (emphasis in original). ”[T]he use of a well-trained narcotics-detection dog ... does not 
implicate legitimate privacy interests.” Id.
Taken together, these cases lead ineluctably to the conclusion that dog sniffs compromise 
no legitimate privacy interests. Here, the defendant’s interest in keeping his marijuana growing 
operation from discovery by police is just like the Jacobsen defendant’s interest in keeping the 
contents of the package of cocaine private. Neither of those interests was legitimate because the 
mere expectation that “certain facts will not come to the attention of the authorities is not 
enough to rise to the level of a Fourth Amendment privacy interest. See Jacobsen, 466 U.S. at 
122. The only results from the dog sniff that were possible in this case were an alert to the 
presence of narcotics, or no alert at all. If there was no alert, no privacy interests would be 
implicated at all. As this Court concluded in Jacobsen, “the likelihood that official conduct. .. 
actually compromise[d] any legitimate interest in privacy seems much too remote to characterize 
the testing as a search subject to the Fourth Amendment.” Id at 124. Even though this case 
involves a residence, the dog sniff itself is no different. The dog sniff, just like the Jacobsen 
field test, is a binary test. No matter where the test is conducted, it can only signal the presence 










not compromise any legitimate privacy interests. Accordingly, the dog sniff did not violate any 
of the defendant’s Fourth Amendment rights.
2. The dog sniff violated no legitimate expectations of privacy because no 
intimate details of the home were revealed.
In Kvllo V. United States. 533 U.S. 27,29 (2001), this Court confronted the issue of 
whether the use of a thermal imaging device constituted an illegal search under the Fourth 
Amendment. The device showed that the roof was hotter than the rest ot tlie house, and that the 
suspect’s house was generally wanner than other houses in the neighborhood. Id. at 30. Agents 
used this data to obtain search warrants for the home and ultimately obtained a guilty plea.
This Court overturned that plea, in part because intimate details of the home could have been 
revealed. at 40. For instance, the thermal imager in Kvllo could have revealed at what hour 
each night the lady of the house [took] her daily sauna and bath - a detail that many would 
consider ‘intimate’ . ...” Id. at 38. All these factors combined to lead to the conclusion that 
“the surveillance [with a thermal imaging device] is a ‘search’ and is presumptively 
unreasonable without a warrant.” Id at 40.
Unlike in Kvllo. the dog sniff here revealed no intimate details of the home. Indeed, it 
would not even be possible for any details to be revealed by the dog sniff. While officers in 
Kvllo inferred the presence of a growing operation, the thermal imager itself revealed the 
temperature of the home. There is nothing inherently illegal about having a home or roof that is 
warmer than the norm. In contrast, a dog sniff can only reveal, in a binary fashion, whether or 
not contraband is present. As there is no legitimate interest in contraband, it cannot be 
considered an intimate detail of the home. Thus, as this Court stated in Caballes, ‘[a] dog sniff 
conducted during a concededly lawful [knock and talk] that reveals no information other than the
12
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location of a substance that no individual has any right to possess does not violate the Fourth 
Amendment.” 543 U.S. at 410.
3. The defendant had no reasonable expectation that dogs, which are a 
routine part of everyday life, would never be in his yard.
Another key factor in the Kvllo decision was the fact that the thermal imager was a novel 
technological device that was not in general public use. 533 U.S. at 33,40. This Court 
expressed concern that advances in technology would “shrink the realm of guaranteed privacy.
Id. at 33. The ruling was based, in part, upon a desire to limit the potential for future 
technological developments to intrude upon citizens’ legitimate expectations of privacy. id
at 33-34,41. Dogs, of course, are not technology. Using a dog’s nose to detect that which our 
own noses cannot is not an advance in technology. Using a dog in this manner merely enhances 
an officer’s already existing olfactory ability to detect low concentration odors, much like a 
flashlight may help officers see in low-light situations. Humans have been using dogs for 
companionship, protection, and hunting for centuries. Moreover, breeding and training dogs to 
hone their sense of smell is nothing new. The hunting dogs known to the Framers are not 
appreciably different from the dogs law enforcement now uses.
Even if this Court decides that narcotics detection dogs are somehow different from other 
dogs, they would not rise to the level of a novel technology. In Ciraojg, law enforcement 
officers did not fly on a typical passenger plane. 476 U.S. at 209. Their flight was also not part 
of any routine sweep or other air traffic. Id. Rather, the officers, who were specifically trained 
to visually identify live marijuana plants, hired a private plane specifically to fly over the 
defendant’s home so that they could see over the tall fences surrounding the yard. ^ This 
airplane was only 1,000 feet above the defendant’s home, an altitude much lower than a typical 
flight. ^ id at 223-24 (Powell, J., dissenting). The uniqueness of the fact that the flight was
undertaken for the specific purpose of peering into the defendant’s home was largely irrelevant.
Id at 214. Instead, this Court focused on the fact that airline traffic was a routine fact of life. Id 
at 215. Any member of the public could have looked down into the defendant’s yard to see the 
marijuana plants. Id It did not matter that the officers were specially trained to recognize 
marijuana. Id at 213. It did not matter that most members of the public were not trained to 
identify marijuana plants and would not have known what they were seeing. jd It did not 
matter that air traffic generally does not occur at an altitude of 1,000 feet. Id What mattered 
was that the officers were in a location they were legally allowed to be, the observation was 
physically non-intrusive, and the plants were clearly visible. Id This Court concluded: [t]he 
Fourth Amendment simply does not require the police traveling in the public airways at this 
altitude to obtain a warrant in order to observe what is visible to the naked eye. Id at 215.
Here, Franky is just like Ciraolo’s privately chartered flight. In particular, it is equally 
irrelevant that most dogs are not trained to detect narcotics, and that most dogs do not show up at 
homes specifically to look for contraband. Moreover, it is significantly more likely that any 
neighborhood dog will end up on one’s front porch than it is that a plane will fly over one s 
home at an altitude of 1,000 feet. If anything, the presence of Franky in this case is more 
reasonable than the targeted fly over in Ciraolo. Because dogs, like planes, are a routine aspect 
of life, “it [wa]s unreasonable for [the defendant] to expect that his marijuana plants were 
constitutionally protected from being observed ... .” Sw jd
4. The defendant had no reasonable expectation of privacy in information 
that is willingly conveyed to the public.
In California v. Greenwood. 486 U.S 35, 37 (1988), the defendant left sealed, opaque 
garbage bags on the curb outside his home for regular trash pickup. Without a warrant, the 
police rummaged through that garbage and found evidence of narcotics use. Id at 38. As Justice
Brennan noted, garbage could harbor telling evidence of the most intimate activity associated 
with private life. Id at 50 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Indeed, the majority conceded that the 
defendants likely had a subjective expectation of privacy in the garbage. Id at 40. Nevertheless, 
this Court reasoned that there was no objectively reasonable expectation of privacy because 
garbage bags left on public streets were readily accessible to members of the public. Id 
Irrespective of the content or nature of information discovered, and despite the defendant s 
efforts to keep the garbage private, this Court held that there was no Fourth Amendment 
protection for garbage placed on the sidewalk. Id Thus, this Court concluded the police cannot 
reasonably be expected to avert their eyes from evidence of criminal activity that could have 
been observed by any member of the public.” Id at 41.
The smell of marijuana emanating from the front door in this case is analogous to the 
garbage in Greenwood. Here, the defendant willingly allowed the odor to flow out the front door 
into an area accessible to the public. Once the odor was outside the home on the front porch, it 
was just like the garbage in Greenwood. It was not likely that anyone would be interested in the 
odor, just like most members of the public would not be interested in garbage. The odor likely 
would have dissipated after a short period of time, just like the garbage would have been picked 
up by the collectors. Irrespective of the subjective intent, the important fact was that the odor, 
like the garbage in Greenwood, was “readily accessible to ... other members of the public. Id 
at 40 (emphasis added). Here, the conclusion is similar to that in Greenwood, the police cannot 
reasonably be expected to avert their noses from evidence of criminal activity that could have 
been smelled by any member of the public.
5. The dog sniff was a minimally intrusive procedure that violated no 
reasonable expectations of privacy.
One of the factors this Court weighs in determining whether a Fourth Amendment 
violation exists is the intrusiveness of the conduct. Caballes, 543 U.S. at 409 (noting that the 
level of intrusion was not constitutionally cognizable). also Jacobs^, 466 U.S. at 125 
(balancing the nature and quality of the intrusion against government interests); Place, 462 U.S. 
at 698 (concluding that dog sniffs are much less intrusive than a typical search). In Place, the 
defendant’s luggage was exposed to a brief dog sniff at the airport. 462 U.S. at 707. The 
luggage remained closed during the sniff. Id This Court distinguished the dog sniff from a 
manual search, in which noncontraband items would have been exposed. Id. It further reasoned, 
“this investigative technique [wa]s much less intrusive than a typical search. Id Even though 
there was a limited disclosure of information, the owner was not “subjected to the 
embarrassment and inconvenience entailed in less discriminate and more intrusive investigative 
methods.” Id Consequently, though the defendant had a legitimate privacy interest in the 
contents of the luggage, none of those interests were violated because only the illegal contents of 
the luggage would be revealed. Id Accordingly, this Court held that the dog sniff did not 
constitute a ‘search’ within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.” Id; accord Caballes, 543 
U.S. at 409: see also City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 40 (2000).
Just as in Place, here too the dog sniff was brief, lasting no more than five minutes.
(J.A. 54.) At no point did the detectives enter the residence or otherwise intrude into protected 
areas. (J.A. 54.) Like the dog sniff in Place, the dog sniff here did not and could not disclose the 
existence of any noncontraband items. The only information the detectives gained from the dog 
search was that the odor of marijuana was coming from the base of the front door. Due to the 
limited nature of the search, the dog sniff did not subject the defendant to any embarrassment or
inconvenience. Indeed, it is quite likely the defendant was not even aware the dog sniff was 
happening. None of the defendant’s legitimate privacy interests in the contents of the home were 
violated.
Furthermore, the Florida Supreme Court erred in concluding that the circumstances of the 
dog sniff amounted to an intmsive procedure. Jardines. 73 So. 3d at 48. The Florida Supreme 
Court dedicated three entire pages to portraying a dog sniff as a “sophisticated undertaking that 
was the end result of a sustained and coordinated effort by various law enforcement 
departments.” Id. at 46-49. The court’s efforts to characterize the actuality of the dog sniff are 
unpersuasive. The court concluded that the dog sniff lasted for hours only by including the 
subsequent execution of the warrant as part of the dog sniff. I^ at 48. As reflected in the record, 
Detective Bartelt arrived with Franky, performed the test, and then left, all in less than ten 
minutes. (J.A. 54.) While the court described the dog sniff as a spectacle, in all likelihood it 
went unnoticed. There is no evidence in the record to support the conclusion that any onlookers 
would have assumed police were involved. It is just as likely that they perceived nothing more
than a neighbor walking an overly inquisitive dog.
Lastly, the Florida Supreme Court expressed misplaced concern about the potential for 
abuse. Jardines. 73 So. 3d at 49. The court analogized the discrete dog sniff at issue here with 
the dragnet checkpoint program at issue in Edmond. Id. at n.7. There is no evidence to support 
the contention that police officers would conduct random sweeps of whole neighborhoods in a 
random search for contraband. In fact, the record shows that the dog sniff was not conducted in 
an arbitrary or discriminatory manner. (J.A. 3, 8.) Those opposed to novel police techniques 
have often sought to stoke emotions by raising the specter of an Orwellian police state of 











nor the resources to conduct random investigations. Indeed, Detectives Bartelt and Franky could 
not spend much time at the defendant’s residence because their services were required elsewhere. 
(J.A. 54.) They would not have had time for arbitrary dog sniffs even if they had desired to 
perform them.
Law enforcement personnel work tirelessly to protect our coinmunities from the scourge
of illegal drugs. They need to retain what few tools they have left to combat the growing
sophistication of the drug dealers. Humans have depended on our canine companions for
protection since the founding of our nation. Man’s best friend is uniquely suited for the task of
identifying narcotics. Dogs have evolved supremely sensitive noses that can detect contraband,
and more importantly, can be trained to only detect contraband. Where, as here, law
enforcement utilizes a minimally intrusive dog sniff that is incapable of infringing any legitimate
expectations of privacy, there is no search within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.
II. THE FLORIDA SUPREME COURT DECISION THAT A DOG SNIFF CAN ONLY 
BE USED AFTER ESTABLISHING THE EXISTENCE OF PROBABLE CAUSE, 
RATHER THAN REASONABLE SUSPICION, IS NOT SUPPORTED BY EXISTING 
SUPREME COURT JURISPRUDENCE.
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution states that the right of the 
people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches 
and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause. U.S. 
Const, amend IV. If this Court holds the dog sniff to be a search, then the presumptive 
evidentiary standard is probable cause. Pavton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 586 (1980). 
However, this Court has held that a reasonable search may justified by reasonable suspicion 
under certain circumstances. Terrv v. Ohio. 392 U.S. 1, 31 (1968).
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A. The Fourth Amendment Only Requires that Warrantless Searches and Seizures
are Reasonable, and in this Case Special Circumstances Warranted Applying a
Balancing Test to Pclcrmine Reasonableness.
Determining whether a search is reasonable is done through balancing government versus 
individual interests. ML at 21. Where “the public interest is best served by a Fourth Amendment 
standard of reasonableness that stops short of probable cause,” this Court has not hesitated to 
apply such a standard. New Jersey v. T.L.Q.. 469 U.S. 351, 341 (1985). Indeed, application of a 
balancing test is required before determining a standard of reasonableness. O’Connor v. Ortega, 
480 U.S. 709, 719 (1987). This test is best described as “balanc[ing] the nature and quality of 
the intrusion on the individual’s Fourth Amendment interests against the importance of the 
governmental interests alleged to justity the intrusion.” Place, 462 U.S. at 703.
1. A Fourth Amendment balancing test is an inherent part of all government 
searches and seizures.
In Delaware V. Prouse. 440 U.S. 648, 654 (1979), this Court stated clearly that “the 
permissibility of a particular law enforcement practice is judged by balancing its intrusion on the 
individual’s Fourth Amendment interests against its promotion of legitimate governmental 
interests.” This Court also stated in Terry that “there is ‘no ready test for determining 
reasonableness other than by balancing the need to search (or seize) against the invasion which 
the search (or seizure) entails.’” 391 U.S. at 21 (quoting Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 
523, 536-537 (1967)). This Court went on to say that the Fourth Amendment requires an 
evaluation of “the reasonableness of a particular search or seizure in light of the particular 
circumstances.” Id. Justice White has also said that “the key principle of the Fourth Amendment 
is reasonableness - the balancing of competing interests.” Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200, 
219 (1979) (White, J., dissenting).
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2. It is appropriate to apply a balancing test to determine if reasonable 
suspicion is the correct standard for dog sniffs.
In Place. Justice Blackmun stated that the intrusiveness of a search could be a factor in 
determining whether to apply a balancing test. 462 U.S. at 723 (Blackmun, J., concurring in 
judgment). Indeed, Justice Blackmun proposed evaluating the dog sniff using a reasonableness 
balancing test. Id However, because courts “should not decide an issue on which neither party 
has expressed any opinion at all,” this Court declined to address it. Id Two other cases 
presented this issue directly but both were denied certiorari. Beale v. United States, 469 U.S. 
1072 (1984), denying cert, to, 736 F.2d 1289 (9th Cir. 1984); Waltzer v. United States, 463 U.S. 
1210 (1984), denying cert, to, 682 F.2d 370 (2d Cir. 1982). Likewise, Justice O’Connor said that 
“distinguishing between searches based on their relative intrusiveness ... is entirely consistent 
with our Fourth Amendment jurisprudence.” Arizona v. Hicks. 480 U.S. 321, 337 (1987) 
(O’Connor, J., dissenting). She stated that “the permissibility of a particular law enforcement 
practice should be judged by balancing its intrusion on the individual’s Fourth Amendment 
interests against its promotion of legitimate governmental interests.” Id at 338. These 
statements contradict the Florida court’s reasoning that “balancing is only appropriate when 
warranted by ‘special needs.’” Jardines. 73 So. 3d at 52 (citation omitted). Additionally, Justice 
Blackmun stated in Florida v. Rover. 460 U.S. 491, 514 (1983) (Blackmun, J., dissenting) that a 
limited intrusion supported by “a special law enforcement need for greater flexibility” may allow 
for the lessor standard of reasonable suspicion.
Determining whether to use a balancing test is a multi-part inquiry. In Terry, this Court 
employed a balancing test to determine that a warrantless search for weapons of an individual 
was constitutional. 391 U.S. at 30. Terry involved a police officer stopping and searching an 
individual while on the sidewalk outside of a business. Id. at 5-6. Based on a reasonable
suspicion that the individual was planning to commit a robbery of the business, the officer 
frisked the suspect. Id. The officer discovered a loaded gun and arrested the suspect. Id at 7. 
This Court determined that even though the officer searched and seized the individual without a 
warrant or probable cause, the stop was constitutional because it was reasonable. Id at 30-31. It 
was deemed reasonable after this Court employed a balancing test that weighed the law 
enforcement interests of the government against the privacy interest of the individual. Id In 
particular, this Court held that the need for law enforcement officers to protect themselves and to 
protect the public outweighed the individual’s interest in being free from a momentary and 
minimally intrusive search and seizure of his person. Id at 22-24. This Court determined that 
the search was appropriate because it only involved patting down the outer layer of the suspect’s 
clothing, and because the police officer only reached into the suspect’s pocket after he felt the 
weapon. Id at 29-30. According to this Court, the intrusion was justified because it was 
“reasonably designed to discover guns, knives, clubs, or other hidden instruments for the assault 
of the police officer.” Id.
When applying the balancing test, this Court’s first step “focus[ed] upon the 
governmental interest which allegedly justifies official intrusion upon the constitutionally 
protected interests of the private citizen.” Id at 20-21. This Court recognized a legitimate 
government interest in “effective crime prevention and detection,” which allows for a police 
officer “in appropriate circumstances and in an appropriate manner [to] approach a person for 
purposes of investigating possibly criminal behavior even though there is no probable cause to 
make an arrest.” Id at 22. The legitimate government interest in effective crime prevention, 
coupled with the “special need” of protecting the officer and the public from concealed weapons
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led this Court to rule that reasonable suspicion was the appropriate evidentiary standard when 
seizing and searching an individual on a public walkway. Id. at 30-31.
In contrast, the Florida court held that there was no basis for performing a reasonableness 
balancing test because a search for evidence qua evidence is not a special need. Jardines, 73 So. 
3d at 52 (citation omitted). However, in Terry this Court did not predicate the application of a 
reasonableness test on whether a special need existed; the “special need” was merely a factor that 
this Court weighed before determining whether an evidentiary standard other than probable 
cause could be used. 391 U.S. at 20. The “special needs” doctrine has usually been applied “to 
uphold certain suspicionless searches performed for reasons unrelated to law enforcement” and 
serves to demonstrate that there is an “exception to the general rule that a search must be based 
on individualized suspicion of wrongdoing.” Edmond, 531 U.S. at 54 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
In the present case, like in Terry, the Court is presented with a “difficult and troublesome 
issue” that has not been squarely addressed. As in Terry, there is a legitimate governmental 
interest in crime prevention coupled with a “special law enforcement need for greater 
flexibility.” Rover. 460 U.S. at 514. If the dog sniff at defendant’s front door is considered to be 
a search, it is wholly appropriate to administer a balancing test to determine whether it was 
reasonable. In T.L.O. this Court stated that “what is reasonable depends on the context within 
which a search takes place.” 469 U.S. at 337. To deny any inquiry into whether the search is 
reasonable would be assuming that the context of a dog sniff is no different than any other 
search. However, this Court’s prior decisions on the nature of dog sniffs refute this claim.
Place. 462 U.S. at 696; Caballes. 543 U.S. at 405; Edmond, 531 U.S. at 32. To deny the 
application of such a test would be to place dog sniffs in the same category as any ordinary
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search and refute the established precedent that a dog sniff is a sid generis law enforcement 
procedure.
B. A Dog Sniff at the Front Door of a Home Is a Reasonable Search that Only 
Requires an Evidentiary Showing of Reasonable Suspicion.
The Florida court incorrectly interpreted this Court’s precedent when it determined that
the dog sniff at the front door of the defendant’s home was an unreasonable search. Even if this
Court determines that the defendant had a legitimate expectation of privacy to the presence of
narcotics within his residence, that privacy interest must still be balanced against the
government’s need to conduct that search. Camara. 387 U.S at 536-37 (“there can be no
ready test for determining reasonableness other than by balancing the need to search against the
invasion which the search entails”). Because the dog sniff was minimally intrusive and the
government interest was substantial, it was a reasonable search.
1. The Florida court failed to consider the government’s general interest in 
preventing the trafficking of illegal dmgs as substantial enough to warrant 
a Fourth Amendment intrusion.
Social necessity is an important government justification in determining when a search 
should be deemed reasonable. Nat’l Treasury Emp. Union v. Von Ra^, 489 U.S. 656, 681 
(1989) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (holding when “the question comes down to whether a particular 
search has been ‘reasonable,’ the answer largely depends upon the social necessity that prompts 
the search”). This justification has been used to uphold other government searches as well. S^ 
e.g.. T.L.O.. 469 U.S. at 339 (holding that the need to prevent drug use and violent crime in 
schools justified search of student’s purse); United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 551- 
52 (1976) (holding that the difficulty of detecting illegal immigration justified the use of a fixed 
immigration checkpoint); Skinner v. Rv. Labor F.xecs.’ Ass’n. 489 U.S. 602, 606 (1989) (holding 
that the problem of alcohol abuse by railroad employees justified engaging in drug and alcohol
testing). Therefore, the social necessity of using a narcotics detection dog to detect narcotics 
inside of the home will be an important factor in the balancing test.
When conducting a reasonableness balancing test, the government’s general interest in 
crime prevention is an important factor. Terry, 392 U.S. at 22. 1 his interest “underlies the 
recognition that a police officer may in appropriate circumstances and in an appropriate manner 
approach a person for the purposes of investigating possibly criminal behavior even though there 
is no probable cause to make an arrest.” Id This generalized interest in crime prevention is 
enough to justify an intrusion on an individual’s Fourth Amendment rights. Place, 462 U.S. at 
704-05; s^ also Michigan v. Summers. 452 U.S. 692, 702-03 (1981) (stating that three separate 
law enforcement interests justified limited seizure). Courts should consider whether these 
generalized interests are “substantial.” Place. 462 U.S. at 704.
The government’s general interest in crime prevention has been considered substantial in 
varying contexts. Terry relied on the interest in protecting the officer and the public from 
concealed weapons, noting that “American criminals have a long tradition of armed violence, 
and every year in this country many law enforcement officers are killed in the line of duty. 392 
U.S. at 23. In T.L.O. this Court recognized the “substantial interest of teachers and 
administrators in maintaining discipline in the classroom” and recognized that drug use and 
violent crime in the schools have become major social problems.” 469 U.S. at 741. Circuit 
courts have upheld the use of metal detectors to protect the public from the substantial threat of 
plane hijackings even though their use constitutes a search without probable cause. See, e.g., 
United States v. Albarado. 495 F.2d 799 (2d Cir. 1974); Unjted States v. Moreno, 475 F.2d 44 
(5th Cir. 1973) (upholding a search of person without probable cause as reasonable based on 
threat of aerial hijacking); United States v. Slocum. 464 F.2d 1180 (3d Cir. 1972) (stating that
the reasonable search was justified by government interest in protecting national air commerce); 
United States v. Epperson. 454 F.2d 769 (4th Cir. 1972).
The threat of the illegal drug trade presents similar pressing issues for law enforcement. 
Indeed, this Court has recognized the “veritable national crisis in law enforcement caused by 
smuggling of illicit narcotics.” United States v. Montova de Hernandez, 473 U.S. 531, 105 
(1985). Justice Powell stated that “[t]he public has a compelling interest in detecting those who 
would traffic in deadly drugs for personal profit.” United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 
561 (1980) (Powell, J., concurring). He further said that “the obstacles to detection of illegal 
[drugs] may be unmatched in any area of law enforcement.” |d. at 562. Justice Blackmun took a 
similar view in Rover. 460 U.S. at 519 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (reasoning “the special need 
for flexibility in uncovering illicit drug couriers is hardly debatable” in the airport context). In 
Place, this Court recognized that the “inherently transient nature of drug courier activity at 
airports” was part of the justification for allowing police to make stops based on reasonable 
suspicion. 462 U.S. at 704. This Court has made it clear that there is a strong social necessity in 
preventing the proliferation of drugs to the public.
As criminal drug traffickers become more sophisticated in their attempts to violate state 
and federal laws, law enforcement needs tools to combat this pervasive threat. Even though 
concealing dmg-grow operations in neighborhood houses is quickly becoming common practice, 
cases such as Kvllo limit the ability of law enforcement to utilize advanced technology to detect 
them. Law enforcement is left to rely on unverified tips and costly and lengthy surveillance to 
establish probable cause. Even novel methods such as subpoenaing utility company records to 
determine energy usage are frustrated by criminal ingenuity - the electricity used to power the 
grow operation is often stolen and thus the increased usage does not show up on utility bills.
(J.A. 43.) Grow operations, as here, also do not exhibit the same characteristics as traditional 
drug operations that would typically be revealed by heavy traffic coming and going from the 
house. (J.A. 44.) Additionally, this Court has stated that the lack of practical alternatives can be 
a factor when determining reasonableness. United States v. Briunoni-Ponce. 422 U.S. 873, 881 
(1975).
Grow operations are easy to set up and even easier to tear down. In this case, the 
defendant established a hydroponics laboratory in only one room and produced twenty five 
pounds of marijuana. (J.A. 112.) The time required to establish probable cause for a warrant 
without the use of a narcotics detection dog such as Franky would allow a trafficker ample time 
and opportunity to flee the premises. The use of narcotics detection dogs during investigation 
has proven to be highly useful; Franky alone has successfully detected the presence of narcotics 
399 times. (J.A. 13.) These positive identifications have resulted in the seizure of more than 
13,008 grams of cocaine, 2,638 grams of heroin, and 936,614 grams of marijuana. (J.A. 13.) 
Narcotics detection dogs are an invaluable asset to law enforcement and the need to utilize them 
before establishing probable cause is substantial.
2. The Florida Court failed to consider the minimal intrusion of the dog sniff.
The government’s substantial interest in fighting the war on drugs is weighed against the 
level of intrusiveness upon the individual’s Fourth Amendment rights. Terry, 392 U.S. at 28 
(“The manner in which the seizure and search were conducted is, of course, as a vital a part of 
the inquiry as whether they were warranted at all.”). A search that is minimally intrusive may be 
justified based on an evidentiary showing of less than probable cause. For example, in Brignoni- 
Ponce. this Court held that a vehicle stop by border patrol agents with reasonable suspicion of 
wrong doing would not violate the Fourth Amendment. 422 U.S. at 881. Specifically, the
“limited nature of the intrusion” was an appropriate factor when applying the balancing test. Id 
“[T]he importance of the governmental interest at stake, the minimal intrusion of a brief stop, 
and the absence of practical alternatives for policing the border” led this Court to hold that a 
vehicle stop near the border could be performed as long as the officer had reasonable suspicion 
of wrong doing. Id
This Court has dealt substantially with dog sniff cases. In other contexts, a dog sniff has 
been determined to be so minimally intrusive that it did not even constitute a search. See, e.g.. 
Place, 462 U.S. at 707 (sniff of luggage at an airport); Caballes. 543 U.S. at 409 (sniff of vehicle 
during a traffic stop). The issue is whether a dog sniff at the front door of a residence is so 
minimally intrusive that on balance, the government interests outweigh the private interests. It is 
well established that searches within the home are presumptively unconstitutional without a 
warrant. Payton. 445 U.S. at 586 (“It is a basic principle of Fourth Amendment law that searches 
and seizures inside a home without a warrant are presumptively unreasonable.”) (internal 
quotation omitted). However, the dog sniff here did not take place within the home but rather on 
the front porch. (J.A. 49.)
Although the defendant might contend that the front porch is encompassed in the 
“curtilage” of the home, and thus given the same protections, an evaluation of relevant precedent 
reveals that this is not so. This Court laid out a four-factor test in United States v, Dunn, 480 
U.S. 294, 302-03 (1987), to determine what areas are within the curtilage of the home. First, the 
relative proximity of the area to the home; second, whether the area is included within an 
enclosure surrounding the home, third, what the nature of the uses to which the area is put, and 
fourth, what steps are taken by the resident to protect the area from observation by people 
passing by.
<p
Applying these factors to the present case, it is clear that the front porch of defendant’s 
residence is not part of the curtilage of the home. While the front porch is naturally in close 
proximity to the home, it is not within any type of enclosure other than a small alcove. (J.A. 49.) 
Additionally, there is no indication in the record that the area around the front door was put to 
any use at all, let alone significant use. Lastly, there is nothing in the record to indicate that the 
defendant took any steps to protect the area surrounding the front door from the prying eyes of 
the public. Because the front porch is not within the curtilage of the home, it should not be 
afforded the same constitutional protections as an area that would be considered curtilage.
Lastly, the dog sniff itself was minimally intmsive. As stated previously, this Court has 
held consistently that a dog sniff is a minimally intrusive procedure, in part because it does not 
reveal anything but contraband. Place. 462 U.S. at 707. The sniff in this case was conducted by 
only two detectives at seven in the morning. (J.A. 32.) The record does not indicate that the 
procedure was a spectacle or that it drew the attention of neighbors or others passing by. While 
it is unclear if the defendant was home at the time of the procedure, there was no response when 
Detective Pedraja knocked on the front door. (J.A. 30.) This Court admitted that the search in 
Terry was “an annoying, frightening, and perhaps humiliating experience. 392 U.S. at 25. 
However, the presence of these factors did not prevent this Court from determining that the 
search was reasonable and none of those factors were present in this case. There is no indication 
in the record that anyone, including the defendant, was annoyed, frightened, or humiliated. 
Because the dog sniff here was so minimally intrusive, and the government interest was 
substantial, if deemed a search the only evidentiary requirement should be reasonable suspicion.
3. There was enough evidence obtained by law enforcement prior to the use of the 
dog sniff to establish reasonable suspicion of wrongdoing.
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The ultimate determination of whether a search is reasonable is based on whether the 
search was justified at its inception, and whether the search was “reasonably related in scope to 
the circumstances which justified the interference in the first place.” Id. at 20. To justify the 
search “the police officer must be able to point to specific and articulable facts which, taken 
together with rational inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant that intrusion.” Id. at 21.
In the present case, specific and articulable facts did exist, and the use of Franky was not based 
simply on the hunch of the officer. First, there was a call from an anonymous informant that 
marijuana was being grown in the residence. (J.A. 8.) Second, Detective Pedraja s observed that 
the residence’s air conditioning unit was continuously running, which can indicate marijuana 
cultivation. (J.A. 38.) Lastly, Detective Pedraja observed that the blinds on the windows were 
closed. (J.A. 109). Applying Terry, these facts coupled with rational inferences would indicate 
that reasonable suspicion of wrongdoing did exist. After applying a balancing test that 
establishes the proper evidentiary standard of reasonable suspicion for the dog sniff, the search 
did not violate the Fourth Amendment and thus the Florida court was incorrect in excluding 
evidence seized from the residence.
CONCLUSION
There was no violation of any Fourth Amendment right in the case at bar. There was no 
search as the defendant met neither prong of the Katz test. The detectives were in areas of the 
property that any member of the public could be. When information is exposed to the public, 
discovering it cannot be characterized as a search. The dog sniff is a minimally intrusive 
procedure that infringes no legitimate expectations of privacy. It can only reveal the presence or 
absence of contraband and lasts only a few minutes. Where no legitimate privacy expectations 
are violated, there can be no Fourth Amendment violation.
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Even if the dog sniff is considered a search it was of a type so minimally intrusive that 
probable cause was not needed to justify its use. Like in Terry, the Florida court should have 
used a balancing test to determine whether the search was reasonable. This test should have 
determined reasonableness by weighing the substantial government interest in battling drug 
cultivators against the minimally intrusive nature of the dog sniff. After performing this 
balancing test, this Court should hold that an evidentiary showing of reasonable suspicion of 
wrongdoing, rather than probable cause, is enough to justify the use of a narcotics detection dog 
at the front door of a residence. Furthermore, there were articulable facts to support the 
conclusion that a reasonable suspicion of wrongdoing did exist.
For these reasons, this Court should REVERSE the decision of the Florida Supreme
Court.
Dated: October 16, 2012 Respectfiilly submitted.
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